TORTS: APPLICATION OF ADULT STANDARD OF CARE
TO MINOR MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS

IN a recent decision, Dellwo v. Pearson,"the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to apply an individualized standard of care to a twelveyear old defendant whose allegedly negligent operation of a motor boat
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The trial court had applied the view
of the vast majority of courts and instructed the jury that the defendant
was required to exercise only the degree of care which is ordinarily
exercised by children of like age, mental capacity and experience.' On
appeal from a verdict for the defendant, the supreme court reversed,
declaring3 that to protect the public from the hazards of traffic, minors
should be held to an adult standard of care4 when operating automobiles, airplanes or motor boats.
Several reasons have been advanced in support of the majority view
granting indulgence to minors in the determination of negligence.,
Courts have recognized that immaturity limits the capacity for fault
by restricting the ability of a child to perceive the probable consequences
2

o7 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. Sup. Ct.

1961).

'This standard of care is often loosely termed subjective. See, e.g., 2 HARPER AND
On closer examJAMES, ToiTs 926 n.ix (1956) ; 74 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 8o (1925).
ination the standard of care, although individualized to the child's physical and mental
development, is still objective in its application, requiring the child to act as a reasonable child with similar attributes. See Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?,
4i H.itv. L. REV. i (1927) 3 Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37
YAL.E L.J. 6i8 (x928).
The qualities taken into consideration by the courts have been expressed in varying
language, but those qualities most often mentioned are age, intelligence and experience.
See cases collected in Annot., 67 A.L.R.zd 570, 576-578 (1959); Annot., 174 A.L.R.
io8o, 1097-1098 (1948).

' The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in instructing the
jury that forseeability is a test of proximate cause. 107 N.W.zd at 86o. The court
went on to order that on retrial the defendant be held to an adult standard of care.
Id. at 863.
'The law of torts requires the exercise of a uniform standard of care by all adults.
The standard is external and objective rather than relying on the judgment of a particular individual. See Seavey, supra note z, at i. In any situation an adult is required
to act as the reasonable man would do in his place. This hypothetical man is a prototype of all proper qualities with only such shortcomings as the community will
tolerate. See PROSSER, ToRTs § 31 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS

§

783, comment c at 14. (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).

'The

most detailed and analytical judicial consideration of these reasons is found

in Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 5oi, 153 Atl. 457 (1931).
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of his acts or omissions6 and have attempted to achieve a concurrence
between legal liability and subjective fault 7 by considering the child's
education, experience and intelligence.
It has also been urged that there is a special public interest in the
protection of children.8 Their basic educational process consists of exposure to an adult society, and in this manner they gradually develop
the skills of adulthood. Imposition of an adult standard would subject
the child to liability for acting as a child in an adult environment.
Courts have protected children from this burden by the application of
a less exacting standard of care.9
Furthermore, an individualized standard is administratively feasible,
because community experience acts as a yardstick which courts can use to
determine with some accuracy the care to be expected from a child of a
10
given age.

*Ibid.
'Even where the individual attributes of the child are taken into account, moral
culpability and legal liability do not exactly coincide. The child's age, intelligence
and experience are only considered in determining the standard of care he will be
required to exercise. The child will still be required to act as a reasonable child with
the above mentioned qualities. Hence carelessness, if greater than average, will not
relieve the child from negligence. Lutteman v. Martin, 20 Conn. Supp. 371, 135 A.2d
6oo (1957); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § x6.8 (1956)5 Shulman, supra note 2,
at 624.
'Charbonnean v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 5ox, 153 At. 457 (930.
'See, e.g., Gernier v. Town of Glastonbury, i18 Conn. 477, 173 Adt. ,6o (1934);
Charbonneau v. MacRury, supra note 8; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Special Note § 1671
comment e at 29-31 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929).
10
Charbonneau v. MacRury, supra note 85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
§ 29 3A, comment b at x8 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1959); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Special
Note § 167, comment e at 29-31 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929) ; 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1153,

1154. (930).

However, the courts have generally refused to make allowances for the shortcomings
of the insane and mentally deficient in the determination of negligence. E.g., Bessemer
Land & Improvement Co. v. Campbell, isz Ala. 50, 25 So. 793 (x899) (excitable
temperament) ; Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, i So. 72 (1892) (dullness);
Georgia Cotton-Oil Co. v. Jackson, 112 Ga. 620, 37 S.E. 873 (19ox)
(stupidity); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, 268 N.Y. Supp. 446 (1934) (insanity); contra,
e.g., Noel v. McCaig, 174 Kan. 677, 258 P.2d 234 (1953).
There are good reasons for this difference in treatment. While the capacity of a
child may be ascertained with reasonable certainty, gradations of mental disease or
deficiency are exceedingly difficult to distinguish. Furthermore, aside from insuring
against the subnormal adult becoming a ward of the state there are no socially significant reasons why his estate should not repair the harm his conduct causes. In the
case of children, however, there is a positive social interest in allowing them to develop
the skills of adulthood free from the onerous burden of tort judgments. RETATEMENT
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There is, however, a growing dissatisfaction with the application of
such a standard to minor motor vehicle operators. In several jurisdictions minors are required to exercise the same driving skills as
adults," and according to one commentator, even in some jurisdictions
nominally making allowances for youthfulness, the trial courts are in
fact requiring an adult standard of care of all drivers. 2
The court in the Dellwo case articulates for the first time many of
the practical considerations that favor holding minors to an adult standard of care when operating motor vehicles. As the court indicates, when
children are playing there are certain physical limitations on the extent
of injury they can cause . 3 In many instances, an adult can advert to
a child's lack of care and protect himself accordingly. However, when
encountering an approaching vehicle driven by a child, whose vehicle has
a capacity for destruction equal to a vehicle driven by an adult, an individual does not know whether the operator is a child, nor can he protect himself even if warned. 4
Moreover, youthful drivers, due to their inexperience and natural
exuberance, have a disproportionately large number of motor vehicle
accidents. 5 Hence the application of a personalized standard could
(SECOND), TORTS § z8 3B, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, x959); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 283 (Supplement, 1948).
'Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.zd 72 (Mo. Sup. Ct. z956) (stitute); Karr v.
McNeil, 9z Ohio App. 458, ixo N.E.zd 714 (x95z) (statute); Biddle v. Mazzocco,
204 Ore. 547, 284 P.2d 364 (1955) (dictum); Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Lines,
99 Utah iZ9i 104 P.2d 225 (1940) (rebuttable presumption of adult responsibility
for minor drivers); see also Hill Transp. Co. v. Everett, 145 F.zd 746 (st Cir.
1944) where the court refused to allow a defendant to assert his minor employee
driver's incapacity.
The majority of courts, however, still apply an individualized standard of care to
child drivers. See, e.g., Mosconi v. Ryan, 94 Cal. App. zd 227, 21o P.zd 259
(1949); Seeds v. Chicago Transit Authority, 346 Ill. App. 472, io5 N.E.zd u26
(1952)5 Harvey v. Cole,'.i5 9 Kan. 239, 153 P.zd 9x6.(1944); Norby v. Klukow,
249 Minn. 173, 81 N.W.2d 776 (957); Chernotik v. Schrank, 76 S.D. 37 4 , 79
N.W.2d 4 (Y956).
12

2 HARPER AND JAES, TORTS § x6.8 n.12 (1956).

"' See generally, Annot., 173 A.L.R. 890 (1948), for a collection of cases dealing
with the liability of children for play injuries.
2, 107 N.W.2d at 863.
"5 James and Dickinson, Accdent Proneness and Acciden Law, 63 HARV. L. REV.
769, 775 (-950).
The court in the instant case states that children are no less prone
to accidents than adults. 107 N.W.2d at 863.
During 1959, drivers under twenty years of age were involved in 13.0% of the
total accidents in the United States although they comprised only 7.2% of the total
drivers. A better measure would relate accidents to miles driven but such information
is not available. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 51 (:960).
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often preclude accident victims from recovering damages because of
the very foibles that make minor drivers dangerous.
The compensation of accident victims presents a significant social

problem.' 6 Automobile, boating and airplane accidents cause a large
number of personal injuries and deaths. 17 If the victims go uncompensated the resulting medical bills and loss of income are a hard-

ship, not only on the individual himself, but also on charitable organizations and society at large."8

This problem has been alleviated some-

what by legislative enactments in numerous states assuring the financial
responsibility of those operating motor vehicles."9 However, as a prerequisite to recovery, the accident victim still must establish the defendant's fault.
Any meaningful appraisal of the effects of tort liability on minors

must also take into account the prevalence of liability insurance.20
Minors are seldom sued in the absence of insurance, because they usually

lack sufficient financial resources to make suit worthwhile. Most minor
drivers are insured by omnibus coverage clauses for which their parents
8

" See generally COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION

FOR AUTOMOBILE Acci-

REPORT (1932); Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences,
3 LAW& CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936); Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. RE'v. 300 (195o) 5 James and Law, Compensation for
Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little Too Late, z6 CONN. B.J. 70 (i95a).
"It is estimated that in 1959 motor vehicle accidents resulted in 37,800 deaths and
DENT,

1,40oo00

injuries disabling beyond the day of the accident.

COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (196o).

In

NATIONAL SAFET

1957 non-commercial aviation accidents

resulted in 8o deaths and 391 serious injuries. Id. at 76. In x958 estimates indicate
that i,z5o people were killed in water accidents, and over one half of these accidents
involved motor boats. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 73, 76 (959).
18.See COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT
19 (1932); 2 HA.RPER AND JAMES, TORTS 730 (1956); Corstvet, supra note x6, at

466; Grad, supra note 16, at 301.
In 1959 the economic loss from motor vehicle accidents was estimated at $t,6oo,ooo
in wages, $15o,ooo,ooo in medical expenses and $2,xoo,ooo in property damage.
TIONAL SAFETY COUNCIl., ACCIDENT FACTS 4, 13 (196o).

NA-

8
" For a survey of the types and effectiveness of these measures see Braun, The
Financial Responsibiilty Law, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (1936); Grad, supra

note 16, at 305-317.

" See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 554-556 (.948).

The cases, however, have held liability insurance is not to be considered in determining whether a child is liable for a tort. Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d
295, 148 N.E.zd 49 (1958); Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.zd og1
(x955); but cf. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.zd 81 (195o); Wendt v.
Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 6x8, 76 N.E.ad 342 (1947). ,
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premium. 2'

pay an extra
Accordingly, any loss resulting from tort
liability is rarely paid by the minors themselves, but rather distributed
among the parents of minor drivers-the group which should most
equitably bear the loss. Although these parents are not often held
personally negligent,2 2 they have provided the child with an instrumentality that can cause serious injury.
The holding in the Delwo case is in one respect inconsistent. The
court first states categorically that in the determination of a minor's
contributory negligence an individualized standard is proper." The
court goes on to state, without exception, that minors operating automobiles, airplanes or motor boats are required to exercise an adult
standard. Thus the standard of care required of a child driver where
contributory negligence is in issue is left unresolved.
Many of the above-enunciated policy reasons favoring an adult
standard are not present where the child is a plaintiff. The application
of such a standard decreases rather than increases the child's chance of
recovery and may place the whole loss upon the child and his family
rather than distributing it through insurance. In this instance the
application of an individualized standard promotes rather than interferei with the compensation of accident victims. Hence, in order to
" James, supra note 2o, at 555.
'A parent is not vicariously liable, as such, for the conduct of a child.

E.g.,

Hagerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac. 62z (x885).
Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis.
4oo, 298 N.W. 738 (1924) , contra, Phillips v. D'Amico, 21 So.2d 748 (La. Ct. App.
2945) (statut*):
The courts, however, have gone to unusual lengths to establish an agency relationship between parent and child. Under "family purpose" doctrine the owner of an
automobile who permits a member of the household to use the automobile for a family
purpose is vicariously liable. These holdings are obviously based on the public policy
of protecting the public from financially irresponsible motorists rather than any real
agency relationship. See PRoSsEa, TORTS 681 (2d ed. 1955). For the divergent views
of the various state courts see Annot., 132 A.L.R. 981 (1941). A recent North Carolina. decision Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, ix9 S.E.zd 784 (1962), refused to
extend the family purpose doctrine to motor boats, deeming this a policy decision
properly made by the legislature.
A parent may of course be negligent himself for entrusting to a child a dangerous
instrument or something the child has shown a propensity to misuse, but motor yehides themselves are not classified as dangerous instrumentalities.
Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49, 124 N.W. zo16 (2go); Hopkins v. Droppers, supra. However, parents have been held liable for entrusting motor vehicles to a child they know
or should know to be incompetent. Daily v. Maxwell, 252 Mo. App. 4x5, 133 S.W.
352 (1912); Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N.C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (2926); Hopkins v.
Droppers, supra; Allen v. Bland, 168 S.W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
23 107 N.W.2d at 862-863.
2
d. at 863.
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allocate the loss from motor vehicle accidents in a socially desirable
manner, minor drivers should be held to an adult standard where they
are defendants and to an individualized standard where they are plaintiffs. 25 In the past, courts have refused to apply such a dual standard"8
but no material obstacle appears to such an approach.
It is submitted that the above considerations-children's capacity
for destruction when operating a motor vehicle, the social problem of
uncompensated accident victims, the propensity of minors to have vehicular accidents, and the social utility of distributing the loss through
insurance-should outweigh any desire on the part of the courts to
achieve a strict concurrence between subjective fault and legal liability.
Within the framework of a system of liability based on fault,7 these
See James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 769, 794-795 (.950).
" The vast majority of early cases dealt with the contributory negligence of minor
plaintiffs. These decisions were uniform in making allowances for the child's age,
experience and intelligence. Annot., 174 A.L.R. xoSo (1948).
When the question
first arose there 'was some conflict as to whether the, same standard of care should be
applied to minor defendants.
The difference between these two situations was noted in the 19z9 Tentative Draft
of the Restatement of Torts. "There are so few cases which involve the liability of a
child defendant that it has been necessary to state the standard of behaviour required
of a child as it is indicated by the analogy of contributory negligence on the part of
young children. There may be some doubt as to whether it is correct to regard contributory negligence and negligence as sufficiently analogous to make one a safe basis
for statements in regard to the other. It may be that children should not be required
to conform to a particular standard in order to relieve an admittedly negligent defendant from liability to them. It does not necessarily follow that a child should not be
required to conform to a higher standard of behaviour where it is necessary for the
protection of innocent members of the public." REsTATEmENT, TORTS, Special Note
§ 167, comment e at 29, 30 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1929) i accord, Roberts v. Ring, 143
Minn. 5x1, 173 N.W. 437 (.9.9) (dictum) 5 Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv.
4o 47 (igxs)i but see Faith v. Massengill, 121 S.E.2d 657, 66o (Ga. Ct. App.
1961) (argument of counsel) 5 Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 570, 576 n.17 (1959).
The courts, however, have rejected or ignored this distinction and gone on to apply
an individualized standard of care to child defendants as well as child plaintiffs. See
Mosconi v. Ryan, 94 Cal. App. zd 227, 21o P.zd 259 (949) 5 Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 80
Cal. App. 2d 5oo, Sz P.2d 234 (1947)5 Lutteman v. Martin, 2o Conn. Supp. 371,
135 A.2d 6oo (1957)5 Harvey v. Cole, 15$ Kan. 239, 153 P.2d 916 (1944);
Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 5o,
53 Atl. 457 (193 ); Fox v. Harding, 6 Pa.
D. & C.zd 785 (1955); Chernotik v. Schrank, 76 S.D. 374, 79 N.W.zd 4 (1956);
Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 13o N.W. 893 (911); RESTATEMENT, ToRr § 283
comment e at 743 (1934); Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, in
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTS 543, 571 (1926); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1277 (1931).
"For three decades commentators have attacked the common law principle of "no
liability without fault ' as inadequate to cope with the problem of automobile accidents
and have argued for the adoption of various social insurance schemes similar to work-
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policies can best be effected by requiring a dual standard of care. All
defendants should be required to operate motor vehicles with a uniform
degree of care, but minor drivers should only be held to an individualized standard of care in the determination of contributory negligence.
The latest tentative draft of the Restatement of Torts would hold
both minor plaintiffs and defendants to an adult standard when engaging "in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults and
for which adult qualifications are required.""' The problem remains
to determine what are "adult activities" and "adult qualifications."
The Restatement suggests legislatively-enacted licensing requirements
as a criteria to circumscribe these areas.2 9 However, as licenses are not
now generally required for the operation of motor boats, the instant
case. illustrates that the proposed criteria is not satisfactory under all
circumstances.
In the future, courts should adopt the approach utilized in the
Deliwo case, determining the standard of care to be imposed by the
extent of damage minors may cause when engaged in the activity in
question. The courts should also consider the effect the imposition of
an adult standard of care liability may have on the allocation of loss,
rejecting application of the Restatement rule to minor plaintiffs because
of the socially undesirable denial of compensation which might result.
man's compensation plans.
MOBILE ACCIDENTS,

E.g.,

REPORT 200

CoMMIrrEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR

AUTO-

(1932) ; Grad, supra note x6, at 305-317; James

and Law, supra note 16, at 70 Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Accident Conpensation Plan, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 583 (1936). It is not within the scope
of this note to discuss the merits and demerits of the proposed alternatives. Here it is
sought only to determine what standard of care should be required within the traditional
framework.
" RETATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS- § 283A, comment c at i9 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1959).

"Ibid. Accord, Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1956)) Karr v.
McNeil, 92 Ohio App. 458, i1o N.E.zd 754 (1952); Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight
Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P.2d 225 (194o); contra, Harvey v. Cole, x59 Kan. 239,
153 P.2d 9x6 (1944); Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 5o, 153 Att. 457 (1931).

